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"The situs of intangible property is about as intangible a concept as
is known to the law."'
I. INTRODUCTION

Recent economic downturns in Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela, to
name a few Latin American states among others in various parts of the world,
have once again raised serious concerns regarding the ability of international
lenders or creditors to recover on the sovereign and private debt instruments
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Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714 (5th Cir. 1968).
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that they hold.? With respect to sovereign debt, while the International
Monetary Fund, the Paris Club, and the London Club have provided institutional mechanisms by which to conduct organized sovereign debt restructurings,
it nonetheless remains for lenders or creditors dissatisfied with the reorganization process to look to the courts to enforce their contractual rights.' Significantly, the predictability of debt restructuring regimes have been eroded by the
emergence of bondholders and secondary market debt purchasers as principal
creditors in place of traditional commercial bank lenders engaged in longstanding relationships with debtor states Apart from the problems endemic in
transnational litigation, this new fixture of non-syndicate or "rogue" creditors
in international sovereign lending has engendered a whole set of legal and
public policy questions, the heart of which falls beyond the scope of this paper,
but which, nonetheless, have already left an indelible imprint on legal
commentary and United States decisional law concerning international public
or sovereign debt.'
In the instance of private debt, which is the realm of creditor-debtor law
this paper will focus on, the gamut of international lender or creditor concerns
similarly runs wide. However, in the international private debt market the
institutional mechanisms for re-negotiation available to sovereign lenders are
ordinarily not available to private creditor-obligees. As a result, these creditorobligees are limited principally to seeking judicial remedies for default or non-

2.
See generally Lex Rieffel, Notion of Odious Debt is Impractical,FINANCIAL TIMES, May 26,
2003; Desmond Lachman, The False Optimistsof the Emerging Markets, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 20, 2003;
World Business Briefing, Americas: Uruguay: Bond Exchange Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2003, at W1;
Jonathan Fuerbringer, Mutual Funds Report; Bonds Eclipse Stocks in Emerging Markets, N.Y. TMES, Apr.
6, 2003, at sect. 3, at p. 15; Larry Rohter, InternationalBusiness; Amid FinancialDespair,Argentines See
a 'Little Summer', N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2002, at C13; Larry Rohter, ArgentinaDefaultson Big Payment to
WorldBank, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,2002, at WI; Juan Forero, Venezuela Economy Falters,Despite Abundant
Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at WI; South America's Troubled Economies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2002,
at A14; Larry Rohter, World Business Briefing, Americas: Argentina: Telecom Default, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
3, 2002; Simon Romero, Defaults Seem Nearfor Latin Units of BellSouth and Verizon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
29,2002, at C4; Simon Romero, AT&Tand Others BraceforTrouble FromArgentina, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
2002, at W1.
3.
See Charles M. Schmerler, Litigating Defaults on Sovereign Debt Law: Policy Struggle to
Defer to Foreign States While Honoring Lender's Rights, N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 15, 2002), available at
http://www.arentfox.comquickGuidebusiness Lines/litig2/litigation-related/ra2002-04-25schmerler/ra200204-25schmerler.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
4.
See, e.g., Elliot Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Naci6n, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999); Pravin
Banker Assocs., LTD. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 895 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); CIBC Bank and Trust
Co. Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
People's Republic of Congo, 729 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
5.
See, e.g., Jote Kassa, Note, A Safety Net for the EurodollarMarket?: Wells FargoAsia Ltd.
v. Citibank, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 126 (1990); William W. Park, Legal Policy Conflicts in International
Banking, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067 (1989).
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payment either, in their own national courts, or the national courts of the
debtor-obligor. Further complicating these creditor-debtor disputes is the
underlying cause for debtor default or non-payment. Increasingly, it has been
noted that the inability of debtors to perform their payment obligations is due,
at least in some part, to foreign government regulations to which the debtor is
subject. As will be discussed below, these regulations may be imposed in
several forms, the prevailing of which are: foreign exchange controls,
mandatory currency conversions, debt repayment moratoria, depositary
expropriations, and unilateral debt restructurings.
The economic distress that a number of Latin American, as well as other
debtor nations must confront, indeed, is likely to increase the resort to creditordebtor litigation, particularly in the United States. While it is true that
international private debt disputes may be litigated in either the home forum of
the creditor-obligee or the debtor-obligor, at least where United States debtors
or creditors are parties to the contracts in question, United States courts have
commonly served as the de facto decision-making forum. More importantly,
however, the prospect of international debt litigation in the United States
arising from these recent economic downturns is likely to revive some difficult
and legally complex issues that remained, arguably, unresolved throughout the
last period of debt crisis litigation in the 1980's.
One issue likely to evoke an extensive and contentious corpus of legal
literature and decisions concerns American notions on international comity and
application of the Act of State Doctrine.6 The Act of State Doctrine has indeed
been the focus of much scholarly debate over the last fifty years.7 While the
majority of commentators have been inclined to support the Doctrine, still a

6.

Other significant issues that arise from the transnational nature of international debt litigation

involve, inter alia, the doctrine of forum non-conveniens, foreign sovereign immunity, jurisdiction to
prescribe, and jurisdiction to adjudicate. See generally ALAN C. SWAN & JOHN F. MURPHY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 242-97 (2d ed.

1999) (providing a basic framework for understanding the impact of these areas of transnational litigation
on international business transactions); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND

ARBITRATION 257-72, 608-97 (2d ed. 2002) (providing cases and discussion on the development of forum
non conveniens and the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976).

7.
For an enlightening sampling of the theoretical and historical background of the Act of State
Doctrine and its relation with other principles of comity consult, see Ifeanyi Achebe, The Act of State
Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Can They Coexist?, 13 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE
247 (1989); Daniel C.K. Chow, Rethinking the Act of State Doctrine: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction
to Prescribe,62 WASH. L. REV. 397 (1987); Margaret A. Niles, Note, JudicialBalancingof Foreign Policy
Considerations: Comity and Errors Under the Act of State Doctrine,35 STAN. L. REV. 327 (1983); Irene
Elizabeth Howie, Note, The Nonviable Act of State Doctrine: A Change in the Perceptionof the Foreign
Act ofState, 38 U. Prrr. L. REV. 725 (1977); Louis Henkin, Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility,
6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1967).
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number of others have called for its abandonment by the courts.' In the courts,
however, the Doctrine has generally enjoyed substantial normative stability
dating back to its earliest articulation in the landmark United States Supreme
Court decision Underhillv. Hernandez.9 The Court in Underhillconsidered an
action in tort for wrongful detention of a United States citizen against a military
government in Venezuela, later recognized as the legitimate governing authority
by the United States." ° The Court held that the sovereign acts of a foreign
government done within its territory were unreviewable by United States
courts."
More than a century later, the Supreme Court invariably has continued to
look to Underhill as the classic statement of the Doctrine. 2 In fact, most if not
all decisions concerning acts of state have maintained a tradition of quoting
verbatim the words of Chief Justice Fuller in Underhill:
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves. 3
In subsequent decisions the Supreme Court has adjoined to their classic
statement in Underhill more precise restatements of the Doctrine and its
theoretical predicate. 4 In what has been termed the "second classic statement

8.
See, e.g., Donald W. Hoagland, The Act of State Doctrine: Abandon It, 14 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 317 (1986); Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325
(1986).
9.
168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (providing a curt distinction between "sovereign risk" and "country
risk").

10.

Id.

11.
Id.
12.
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,416 (1964); First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,763 (1972); Alfred Dunhillof London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 691 n.7 (1976); W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990).
13.
Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
14.
See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918) ("The principle that the conduct
of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another [must] rest...
upon the highest considerations of international comity and expediency..."); Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246
U.S. 304 (1918) ("the details of such [confiscatory] action or the merit of the result cannot be questioned but
must be accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision").
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of the act of state doctrine,"' 5 the Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino6 announced:
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government,
extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the
absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding
controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the
taking violates customary international law.'7
The Act of State Doctrine, thus, is squarely implicated by some of the potential
debt litigation that may ensue given the proclivity of debtor nations to intervene
the private banking sector to curb the devaluative effects of financial crises on
domestic currency. While this measure appears extreme, even mitigated
options such as exchange controls raise the same Act of State problems for
international creditors. Nonetheless, the dire economic conditions many debtor
nations must confront leave a dearth of alternatives for government
policymakers other than adoption of such stringent measures, which effectively,
and quite intentionally, disrupt the performance of payment obligations flowing
from local debtors to foreign creditors. As such it is of significant value that
the Doctrine be examined and its application better understood in anticipation
of what may, although hopefully not, turn out to be a reemergence of mass
international debt litigation in the United States.
This paper will attempt to address some of the salient issues in the
territoriality inquiry that the courts since Sabbatinohave been concerned with.
Additionally, this paper will make an earnest attempt to examine key problems
in international debt (i.e., intangible property rights) cases. The following
section of this paper will deal directly, and at some length with notions of
territoriality as developed by the courts and commentators subsequent to
Sabbatino. Further, that section will treat the historical and modern functions
of the territorial limitations in the Act of State Doctrine. Section three will deal
in greater length with the major approaches to situs of debt rules relevant in the
Doctrine. That section will treat the underlying rationale for these rules, and
argue for an enhanced rule of reason in guiding judicial situation of
international debts. Section four will recapture some of these salient points and
provide some concluding remarks.

15.
1988 U. ILL.
16.
17.

See Michael Gruson, The Act ofState Doctrine in Contract Cases As a Conflict-ofLaws Rule,
L. REv. 519, 530 (1988).
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
Id. at 428.
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TERRITORIALITY INQUIRY

One important element the Court refined in Sabbatino was the proposition
that application of the Act of State Doctrine was not dependent upon the
inclusion of the acting state in the litigation.' 8 In Sabbatino the plaintiff, an
instrumentality of the Cuban government, brought an action in conversion
against a court appointed receiver in New York City to recover payment for a
shipment of sugar that had been previously confiscated by the government
within Cuban territory. 9 The Court, nonetheless, maintained that the Act of
State Doctrine could very well be raised even in the context of non-state party
disputes.2"
Another important element, perhaps the more crucial one to territoriality,
in the Sabbatinodecision was the rehashing ofjudicial self-restraint principles,
particularly over foreign political matters. The newer modification of the Act
of State Doctrine in Sabbatino indeed appeared to reflect a judicial
preoccupation with the increased exercise of expropriatory and confiscatory
takings by sovereign states of foreign-owned property. Within a short time
period preceding Sabbatino, and shortly thereafter, numerous nation-states
underwent significant social and political changes, the most notable of which
was embodied in the Cuban revolution and the movements for de-colonization
in Africa and Asia. Understandably then, the Court in Sabbatino,following the
dictates of Underhill, deemed it necessary to clarify that even takings in
contravention of international customary law would be barred from examination
by American courts irrespective of whether it was American-owned or locallyowned property that was taken abroad.2'
The Court, however, made its holding in Sabbatinoclear that the Doctrine
would not apply where the acting sovereign had taken property not located
within its territory.22 While this proposition had been an implied part of the
holding in Underhill, Sabbatino strived to transform the territoriality inquiry

18.
Id. at 417-18, 428; Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252 (While it is clear the Sabbatino opinion
established that the Act of State Doctrine was generally applicable independent of the acting state's
participation in litigation, the rudiments of this proposition were first borne out in the Oetjen and Ricaud
cases).
19.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 402-09. The previous owner of the Cuban sugar attempted to intervene
as party to the litigation but was unsuccessful.
20.
Id. Unlike foreign sovereign immunity, which necessarily involves foreign governments or their
instrumentalities in litigation, the Act of State Doctrine operates more akin to an issue preclusion or a strict
choice of law rule. See, e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1113 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing to
Sabbatinofor the proposition that the Act of State Doctrine does not require government defendants, or even
that the subject matter of the dispute, to be specifically based on a sovereign act).
21.
Sabbatino,376 U.S. at 422; see also Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 716 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting the point supported by the plurality and concurrence opinions).
22.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
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into one of the only sharp points of distinction in the Doctrine. The Court, thus
raised a judicial wall of separation from reviewing acts undertaken by foreign
governments within their territory, while dismantling any opportunity to have
the Doctrine apply to cases where property rights in the United States were
affected by foreign government regulations. A handful of commentators have
questioned the development of this doctrinal threshold element as one not
entirely rooted in traditional notions of international comity and respect for
sovereign authority. 23 Notwithstanding criticism, the Sabbatino restatement
with its central concern for territoriality has become the guiding rule of law.
Until Sabbatino,although arguably thereafter as well, the Court had been
certain to indicate that the rule of decision contained in the Act of State
Doctrine was predicated upon notions of international comity. 24 Nonetheless,
beginning with the Sabbatino decision the Court began to elaborate a distinct
foundation for the Doctrine. 25 Rather than resting on international comity, the
Court in Sabbatino and subsequent decisions has made it clear that the Act of
State Doctrine has "constitutional underpinnings" and rests upon separation of
powers concerns that generally preclude the judiciary from meddling in the
foreign affairs powers of the Executive Branch.26 Under this "judicial
institutional" explanation of the Doctrine, Sabbatino and its progeny have
essentially developed the rationale that where a foreign sovereign undertakes
governmental action that affects (expropriates, confiscates, modifies, etc.)
property not within its territory then the Act of State Doctrine will not apply
since the Executive Branch could not possibly be "embarrassed" from judicial
action before the other nations of the world, particularly the acting state. This
rationale, of course, presupposes that extraterritorial regulation of property
rights by foreign governments fails to raise political questions and that these
should not be accorded a high degree of comity and respect.
The new rationale for the Act of State Doctrine advanced in Sabbatino,
while argued to be logically flawed in some areas, 27 however, probably does
23.
See, e.g., Bazyler, supra note 8; Henkin, supra note 7.
See Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 303; Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); but
24.
cf.Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421 (noting that the doctrine is not compelled by the inherent nature of sovereign
authority or by some principle of international law; historic notions of sovereign authority do not dictate the
doctrine's existence).
25.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423, 427-28. See also Stephen Zamora, Recognition of Foreign
Exchange Controls in InternationalCreditor's Rights Cases: The State of the Art, 21 INT'L LAw. 1055,
1070 (1987) (noting three separate theoretical predicates employed by the Court in Act of State Doctrine
cases); Kenneth L. Miller, Note, Debt Situs and the Act of State Doctrine: A Proposalfor a More Flexible
Standard,49 ALB. L. REV. 647, 651 n.16 (1985).
26.

Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423; Louis Henkin, The ForeignAffairs Powerof the FederalCourts:

Sabbatino,64 COLUM. L. REv. 805, 809-13, 820, 828 (1964).
27.
See Bayzler, supranote 8, at 373; Robert S. Rendell, The Allied Bank Case and Its Aftermath,
20 INT'L LAw. 819, 826-27 (1986).
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appropriately limit the Doctrine's application to territorial state actions. It is
indisputable, at least as a matter of law, that when the "parties and the res are
outside the foreign government' s territorial boundaries, the foreign government
does not possess the ability to alter the legal status of the parties relative to the
res.' 28 The Court's rationale in Sabbatinoindeed reflects reasonable notions
of territorial sovereignty and comity among independent states. It is not an
unsound proposition that "judicial re-examination of a foreign sovereign's act
will vex relations with foreign governments or hinder the executive in the
conduct of foreign policy only when courts act to frustrate the foreign
sovereign's reasonable expectations of dominion."29 It follows, then, that a
reasonable expectation of dominion would be fatally attenuated where a
sovereign state acts to regulate property not located within its territory. ° As a
matter of positivist logic, so much is generally conceded. The difficulty,
however, comes with the judiciary's determination of when and where
territorial state action has transpired. The questions to resolve, thus, seem
readily framed: what property exactly is the territorial action being asserted
over and when is its location ascertainable? Whereas, these queries have been
adequately treated in disputes arising from state actions that "take" tangible
property, the judiciary has struggled terribly to arrive at an equally expeditious
treatment where intangibles are concerned." Consider the following intangible
property dispute scenarios:3 2
Case 1-A United States bank makes a loan to a foreign borrower
(sovereign or private), and brings an action in the United States to
28.
Miller, supra note 25; see also Alfred Dunhill of London, 425 U.S. at 686-87, 691 n.7; First
Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 768; id. at 787 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chem.
Bank of New York, 658 F.2d 903,908 (2d Cir. 1981); United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868,
874-75 (2d Cir. 1976); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1972) (concluding that
a foreign sovereign is obviously unable to complete an expropriation of property beyond its borders); F.
Palicio y Compaftla, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 483-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
29.
Margaret E. Tahyar, Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Resolving Debt Situs Confusion, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 594, 609 (1986).
30.
See Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the theory
underlying the territorial limitation to the act of state doctrine is that a foreign state is less concerned about
effect of its acts on property outside of its territory than within); Maltina Corp., 462 F.2d at 1021. See also
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (also termed the "second Hickenlooper amendment" presently bar application of the
Act of State Doctrine with respect to property located within the United States where the act of expropriation
contravenes international law).
31.
See F. & H.R. Farman-Farmaian Consulting Eng'rs v. Harza Eng'g Co., 882 F.2d 281, 286 (7th
Cir. 1989) (Judge Parsons commenting that "a debt (like a word, a number, an idea) has no space-time
location; it is not a physical object, and efforts to treat it as such, like efforts in conflicts of law jurisprudence,
now largely abandoned.., to find the site of a contract, seem bound to fail").
32.
The characterizations of these model cases are derived from Tahyar, supra note 29, at 614-16.
See also Zamora, supra note 25, at 1056-58.
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enforce the loan following the imposition of exchange controls that,
effectively, prevent the borrower from servicing the debt with the
contractually stipulated currency (United States dollars).
Case 2- A United States bank depositor deposits dollars in a foreign
bank (government-owned or private), and the implementation of
exchange controls by the foreign government prevents the depositor
from withdrawing dollars; the dollar deposit subsequently is
converted to local currency at the government-declared rate, hence
becoming greatly devalued. The depositor brings an action against
the foreign bank in the United States.
Case 3-A foreign depositor deposits funds in a United States bank;
the government of the foreign depositor brings an action against the
bank in the United States to collect the deposit following an
expropriatory or other regulatory act undertaken by the foreign
depositor's government asserting ownership over the account.
Case 4-A depositor (either from the United States or foreign)
deposits funds in a foreign branch office of a United States bank, and
brings an action against the bank's home office in the United States
to recover the deposit following the depositor government's seizure
of the branch's accounts or its prohibition of withdrawals pursuant
to exchange controls.
Case 5 -A foreign government expropriates property owned by one
of its subjects, and then sells the property for export to the United
States. The former owner of the expropriated property relocates to
the United States and brings an attachment action against the United
States buyer to recover proceeds or account receivables derived from
the sale of the expropriated property.
Case 6 -A United States seller exports goods to a foreign buyer, and
the foreign buyer's government imposes exchange controls thus
preventing the foreign buyer from making payment in the
contractually stipulated currency. The United States seller brings an
action in the United States to collect payment.

Clearly, these scenarios raise issues the nature of which vary substantially,
legally and practically, from the more basic tangible property cases which
plainly involve the "taking" of movable property or realty located within the
territory of the acting state. Still, however, courts continue to fit intangible
property into some conception of place and time. To better understand this core
convergence a historical perspective on the rules of territoriality might be
appropriate.
A. History and Development
The foundation of United States law and policy regarding the conduct of
foreign governments acting to regulate rights within and outside their territory
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can be traced back to the notions of sovereignty developed within the
Westphalian regime of international politics. 3 3 Under this regime, the state's
authority to regulate affairs within the state was an inherent and unquestionable
exercise of sovereign power free from review or re-examination by other
states.34 "Thus, an act valid where done [could not] be called into question
anywhere" outside the jurisdiction sanctioning its validity.35 While this basic
tenet of vested rights theory developed in the 17th century continues to recede
from modem American jurisprudence, 36 its underlying rationale has
occasionally maintained a significant degree of adherence among American
courts with respect to issues in conflicts of law, and prescriptive and personal
jurisdiction. 7 The courts, thus, have selectively opted against vested rights
theory in adjudicating some issues implicating more than one body of sovereign
law, while favoring the theory in other cases.38
The dichotomy engendered by the selective application of vested rights
theory has been explained as an implicit acknowledgement by the American
courts that giving effect to, or perhaps more accurately, exercising restraint
from deciding disputes based on foreign regulations requires a certain degree

33.

See TORBJORN L. KNUTSEN, A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 84-86 (2d ed.

1997) (articulating the proposition that the power to exercise sole control over rights and duties within a
territory was a prerequisite to achieving sovereignty); see also SEYOM BROWN, THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION
OF WAR 104-05 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that 'Vestphalian norms give pride of place to national sovereignty
and the noninterference by countries in another's domestic affairs").
34. See Chow, supranote 7, at 405-06.
35.

3 J. BEALE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 517 (1902); see Chow, supra

note 7, at 405-06 & n.47 (providing a brief account of the influence of legal positivism and vested rights
theory on notions of territoriality in the Act of State Doctrine).
36.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). See Thomas Byron Ia A
Conflict of Laws Model for ForeignBranch Deposit Cases, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 671, 690 (1991).
37.
See Chow, supra note 7, at 406-09. See also McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1971)
(noting that the foundation ofjurisdiction is power); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357

(1909) (noting that "[all legislation is prima facie territorial"). While the narrow holding in American
Banana has been overruled in subsequent years, the general thrust of the Court's opinion in that case remains
an influential guide through prescriptive jurisdiction cases.
38.
See Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 357; Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918)
('The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned in the
courts of another [must] rest . . . upon the highest considerations of international comity and expediency..."); Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918) ("the details of such [confiscatory] action
or the merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be accepted by our courts as a rule for their
decision"); These cases represent only a select instance where the courts strongly favored a vested rights
approach. Cf Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (holding that the principle of comity is essentially
a voluntary recognition of foreign acts); Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,
440 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that "[clomity is a recognition that one nation extends to within its own territory
to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law, but one of practice convenience,
and expediency") (emphasis added).
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of relaxation of the forum's own sovereignty.39 As such, the fundamental
predicate of vested rights theory (sovereign power) appears irreconcilably at
odds with the natural consequences of requiring that vested rights be recognized
everywhere. The resulting effect of vested rights theory, thus, has served to
maximize the acting states territorial sovereignty while minimizing that of the
forum state.40 The reasoning is that where a foreign state acts to regulate
property rights squarely within its territory then it has sole territorial
sovereignty to do so. Under vested rights theory this means that the act of state
must be given strict effect anywhere outside the acting state's territory. This
strict effect mandate, of course, would also mean that the forum state would
have to relax its territorial sovereignty in order to give such effect to the
regulation of the acting state.4'
While there certainly appears to be an undercurrent of vested rights
rationale in the territorial limitation to the Act of State Doctrine, the Doctrine
does not entirely depend on that theory. 42 Rather, the Doctrine more soundly
rests on the principles that attempt to detach the judiciary from balancing the
territorial sovereignty of two states, that is, the acting state and the forum
state.4 3 These principles are collected under the self-restraint penumbra of nonjusticiable political questions.' In essence, the Doctrine's territorial inquiry
has been designed to serve more as a determinant alerting the courts as to when
to avert the consequences of vested rights (minimization of forum sovereignty)
on non-justiciable grounds, or when to proceed safely to determine the extent
of international comity without the mandate of strict effect. 45 The Doctrine,
39. See Chow, supra note 7, at 410-11.
40. Id.; but cf.Am. Banana,213 U.S. at 357 (Justice Holmes suggesting that the mere election of
a party subject to foreign sovereign law to litigate in the United States only requires the forum to consider and
apply foreign law without, at the same, relaxing notions of the forum's sovereignty).
41.
See E. ScOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws 13-15 (1982).
42.
See Chow, supra note 7, at 408-09 (stating the proposition that Sabbatinofundamentally recast
the rationale for the Act of State Doctrine from one of external (strict effect to territorial sovereignty of acting
state) to internal deference (non-justiciablity for reasons of separation of powers and abstention from deciding
issues of sovereignty minimization and foreign policy); Cf.Charles Mac. Mathias, Jr., Restructuringthe Act
of State Doctrine: A Blueprintfor Legislative Reform, 12 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369, 392 (1980).

43.
See Chow, supra note 7, at 415-16.
44.
See Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186,217 (1962) (providing the seminal statement on doctrinal tests
involved in determining non-justiciable political questions as
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind for nonjudicial discretion, or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decisions already made, or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question);
Swan, Act of State at Bay: A Plea on Behalf of the Elusive Doctrine, 1976 DUKE L.J. 807, 848-55 & n. 145.
45.
See Chow, supra note 7, at 444 (providing an explanation of the courts' doctrinal management
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hence, allows a shift of decisional power on the former determination from the
judiciary to, presumably, the Executive branch. This shift is predicated on the
not unsound assumption that the Executive is better suited to seek appropriate
means of remedial redress on behalf of private actors from other sovereign
states in the international plane.
B. Modem Function
The historical effect of the territorial inquiry was to raise the question for
the judiciary of whether to apply the Act of State Doctrine, thereby eluding a
direct confrontation with the issue of forum sovereignty minimization, or to
employ notions of international comity to discretionarily enforce the acting
state's policies affecting property within the forum. This bifurcation,
nonetheless, accorded the party raising the Doctrine as a defense in litigation
an exception to the territorial limitation. While the rules of comity, of course,
depend on jurisprudential balancing of interests and public policy
considerations, the territoriality inquiry could be obviated if enforcing the
acting state's policy did not offend the forum's notions ofjustice and fairness.46
This interest and policy-balancing component to the territoriality inquiry was
firmly established in earlier jurisprudence dating back to the first half of last
47
century.

The modem effect of the inquiry, however, has proven that the judiciary
proposes a much sharper bifurcation of results under the Act of State Doctrine.
Since the Court's pronouncements in Oetjen, Ricaud, and Sabbatino, the
consequence of falling outside the purview of the Doctrine's territorial
limitation has meant, with a large measure of certainty, that the acting state's
policies will not be enforced or be given effect in the forum state.48 Hence, the
territoriality inquiry has, indeed, become one of burden shifting and risk
allocation in transnational property rights litigation. 49 The practical effect of

following a determination that the acting state has undertaken to regulate property outside its territorial
sovereignty).
46.
See Chow, supranote 7, at 410-11; Elliot E. Cheatham, American Theoriesof Conflict of Laws:
Their Role and Utility, 58 HARv. L. REV. 361, 367-68, 373 (1945).
47.
See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (holding that the principle of comity is the
"recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive orjudicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws"); See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
48.
See Chow, supra note 7, at 444. See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937-38
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862,864 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d
624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976); Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
1971).
49.
See Jose Ibietatorremendia, Exchange Control Risk in Eurodollar Deposits: A Law and
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this burden and risk allocation function has meant the "[D]octrine does not
apply at all when the foreign sovereign attempts to take property located in the
United States."5 The reason for this sharp-edged rule seems explicable only
by the judiciary's reluctance, indeed refusal, to abstain from deciding against
issues of property takings by a foreign sovereign.5
Due to its modem function, the territoriality inquiry will rarely, if ever,
yield a result other thanjudicial abstention from examining another sovereign's
regulation of property rights within its territory, or judicial denunciation of
property takings outside the acting states territory. Applying this, seemingly
strict, territorial "win or lose" rule has traditionally led to some reasonable
outcomes in disputes regarding tangible property.52 However, as earlier stated,
the more difficult question remains: how to determine who wins and who loses
in disputes over property the physical nature of which is indefinable, to be sure,
intangible. Put simply, the question is: where is the intangible property. As
reasonable as may be the outcome in tangible property cases under the
territoriality inquiry, the judiciary's treatment of disputes over issues of debt
and other chooses in action leave much to be desired in the way of reason and
consistency.53

HI. THE SITUS OF DEBT RULES
Transnational intangible property disputes involving sovereign acts
affecting debt obligations have generally relied on three distinct theories for the
determination of the situs of debt, in other words, the place where the intangible
property is located.54 The first, and most traditionally rooted, traces the
positivist theories on the in personam jurisdictional power of sovereigns to
subject persons within the sovereign's territory to its regulations. This theory
has produced the "jurisdiction over debtor" rule. The second theory focuses on
a similar positivist concern. However, rather than looking solely to jurisdiction,

Economics Perspective,141 U. PA. L. REV. 591,593. See also Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897)
(providing a curt distinction between "sovereign risk" and "country risk").
50. Chow, supra note 7, at 444.
51.
See Tahyar, supra note 29, at 595-96.
52. See Joseph B. Frumkin, The Act of State Doctrineand ForeignSovereign Defaults on United
States Bank Loans: A New Focusfor a Muddled Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 488 (1985).
53. See Byron, supra note 36, at 680; Peter S. Smedresman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Eurodollars,
MultinationalBanks, and NationalLaws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 735 (1989); Joseph H. Sommer, Where
is a Bank Account?, 57 MD. L. REV. 1, 86 (1998); Ibietatorremendia, supra note 49, at 601; P.J. Rogerson,
The Situs ofDebts in the Conflicts ofLaws-Illogical, Unnecessary,andMisleading,49 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 441,
441-44, 453-60 (1990); L. Goldwaithe, Comment, Recent Approaches to Situs of Debt in Act of State
Decisions, 1 CONN. J. INT'L L. 151, 182-83 (1986).
54.
See generally Courtade, Annotation, Situs of Debt or Propertyfor Purposes of Act of State
Doctrine, 77 A.L.R. FED. 293 (1986).
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this second theory, more importantly, looks at the sovereign's power to
complete the alteration in property rights within its territory. This theory has
produced the "fait accompli" or "complete fruition" rule. While these two
theories have been stringently criticized for producing mechanical rules without
demonstrating due respect for the underlying rationale of the Act of State
Doctrine, most courts have not entirely, or even partly, abandoned them. Yet,
a handful of courts and commentators have developed a third rule that seeks to
avoid rigid, litmus-like situs tests in favor of a rule of reason and
circumstance." This latter attempt has produced the "incident of the debt" rule,
the analysis of which "considers whether judicial inquiry will frustrate5 6 the
foreign sovereign's reasonable expectations of dominion over the debt.
A. Pointing to JurisdictionOver Debtor
In the seminal case of Harrisv. Balk,57 the United States Supreme Court
held that "the obligation of the debtor to pay his debt clings to and accompanies
him wherever he goes. ' 58 The Court in Harriswent on to state the debtor "is
as much bound to pay his debt in a foreign state when therein sued upon his
obligation by his creditor, as he was in the state where the debt was
contracted. '59 Essentially, then, under this reasoning a debt is located within
the territory, even if foreign, to whose jurisdiction the debtor is subject.
While the Court in Harrisemployed the term "foreign" to characterize a
debt incurred in North Carolina but litigated in Maryland, the holding has been
applied beyond interstate debt disputes to those involving cross-border
transactions. In Menendez v. Saks & Co.,' the Second Circuit applied the
Harrissitus test to a factual scenario upon which the above model Case five is
based. In Menendez, the dispute arose from the Cuban government's
confiscatory taking of a Cuban-owned cigar exporting business. 61 The original
Cuban owners instituted an action against a cigar importer in the United States
alleging that pre-confiscation debts owed to them by the importer were not
located in Cuba, hence not subject to the Act of State Doctrine.62 The circuit
court agreed, holding that since the cigar importers were subject to the court's
55.
See Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 570 F. Supp. 870, 881-84
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 443 comment a (1987).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
v. Republic
61.
62.

See Chow, supra note 7, at 439.
198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905).
Id.
Id. at 223.
485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'don othergroundssub nom.; Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.
of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
Menendez, 485 F.2d at 1365-66.
Id.
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inpersonamjurisdiction,the debts owed to foreign creditors were located in the
United States, thus the Doctrine was inapplicable.63
In a few intangibles cases preceding Menendez, the Second Circuit had
already evinced an inclination toward considering the "jurisdiction over debtor"
rule.' 4 In Republic of Iraq, the court held that a bank deposit account carried
in New York was a debt owed by a debtor over whom the court had in
personamjurisdiction. 65 As a result, the Act of State Doctrine was inapplicable
and the newly formed Iraqi government, claiming to have confiscated all of the
depositor's (King Faisal) assets, was unable to also affect the bank's debt to the
accountholder' s estate.
In light of these Second Circuit cases, the "jurisdiction over debtor" rule,
indeed, became a mainstay in the territoriality inquiry. 66 However, within only
a few years following Menendez the rule's inherent problems would gradually
become apparent. For one, the courts had not articulated an alternative
rationale to the obvious problem of shared jurisdiction, where both the acting
state and the forum state exercised in personam jurisdiction. Secondly, the
courts seemed content in continuing to apply this rule ignoring the even greater
problem of foreign sovereign intangible takings based on the simple assertion
of jurisdiction over a debtor, particularly United States banks operating foreign
branches or multinational entities. 67 Theoretically, a strict and mechanical
application of the "jurisdiction over debtor" rule would render a creditor
powerless to enforce a debt whose obligor (domestic or foreign) was even
tenuously subject to the jurisdiction of another sovereign having attempted to
"take" that intangible.
B. Pointing to "FaitAccompli" or "Complete Fruition"
Shortly following the decision in Menendez, the Second Circuit again had
opportunity to treat the "jurisdiction over debtor" rule of Harrisin UnitedBank
Ltd. v. Cosmic International,Inc.68 The facts in Cosmic present a scenario
fundamentally similar to Menendez, where a pre-confiscation owner and the
63.
Id.
64.
See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892,910-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l. City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965).
65.
See Republic ofIraq, 353 F.2d at 51.
66.
Other court opinions adopting the Harris approach included: Rupali Bank v. Provident Nat'l.
Bank, 403 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Fed. Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 813
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981).
67.
See Richard Herring & Friedrich K. Degreesubler, Allocation of Risk in Cross-borderDeposit
Transactions,89 Nw. U. L. REV. 942,989-90 (arguing that a "government should not be allowed to interfere
with a deposit made in another country if its only justification is that it can put its hands on property owned
by the depositary bank").
68.
542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976).
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newly formed government of Bangladesh claimed pre-confiscation accounts
receivables owed by a United States creditor. Whereas in Menendez and
Republic of Iraq the court avoided addressing the issue of shared jurisdiction
over the debtor,69 in Cosmic, the Second Circuit dealt squarely with the
problem.70 The court there recognized, at least impliedly, that in personam
jurisdiction alone could not afford the sole basis upon which to determine the
situs of intangible property under the Act of State Doctrine.71 More
importantly, the court's reasoning in declining to follow the Harris and
Menendez analysis touched upon the basic problems with the "jurisdiction over
debtor" rule mentioned above.
First, the court declined to determine whether the acting state had any
jurisdiction over the debtor.72 To this extent, the court stated: "jurisdictional
determinations would inevitably require American courts to engage in complex
interpretations of foreign statutory and case law pertaining to jurisdiction,
resolving situs questions on such a basis would deprive the act of state doctrine
of certainty and predictability."73 Short of entirely rejecting the "jurisdiction
over debtor" rule, the court nonetheless denied having previously adopted the
strict jurisdictional approach and determined that following such a rule would
give the Act of State Doctrine "needless scope."74 As a result, the court
implicitly recognized that it was required to apply a rule that would obviate the
need for a potentially complex shared jurisdiction analysis.
Second, in looking for an alternative to jurisdictional analysis, the court
elected to employ and base its decision on the "fait accompli" rule, which had
been previously adopted by the Fifth Circuit in a factual pattern virtually
indistinguishable from Menendez and Cosmic, TabacaleraSeveriano Jorge,
S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co. 75 While the Menendez opinion provided a

69. See Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1365 (2d Cir. 1973) (providing that the result
might differ were the importer-debtor "present in Cuba or subject to the jurisdiction of Cuban courts" at the
time of the confiscation); Republic ofIraq, 353 F.2d at 51 (recognizing that its conclusion might differ if the
foreign sovereign could also assert jurisdiction over the debtor).
70.
Cosmic Int'l, 542 F.2d at 874.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
392 F.2d 706, 714-15 (5th Cir. 1968). Tabacalerawas, perhaps, the first true intangibles case
arising from the long series of Cuban confiscations revisited in United States courts. In establishing the
"complete fruition" test the court in Tabacaleraheld:
When a foreign government performs an act which is an accomplished fact, that is
when it has the parties and the res before it and acts in such a manner as to change the
relation-ship of the parties touching the res, it would be an affront to such foreign
government for courts of the United States to hold that such an act was a nullity.
Furthermore, it is plain that the [previous] decisions [have taken] into consideration
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rudimentary statement of the "fait accompli" rule,76 the more developed rule
and rationale in Tabacalera was applied in Cosmic. This alternative rule
appeared to address the secondary "jurisdiction over debtor" flaw of ignoring
intangibles "takings" exercised by foreign sovereigns solely and tenuously
asserting in personam jurisdiction over the debtor, thus leaving a creditor
powerless before an Act of State defense. The court in Cosmic, thus,
determined that the situs of a debt was within the acting state's territory if the
state had the power to enforce or collect the debt, leaving the forum court no
means by which to rectify the alteration in property rights."
The "fait accompli" debt situs rule established in Tabacalerahas been
hailed as a "common sense" one because it is predicated on the foreign
sovereign's ability to extinguish the debt obligation through its collection power
over funds carried locally and/or payments to be made by the debtor.7" Quite
obviously, jurisdiction over the debtor is a prerequisite to the power to collect
the debt. Thus, in this sense the "fait accompli" rule is a more comprehensive
situs determinant. However, this rule too has intrinsic flaws.79 For one, the rule
assumes that forum courts will always be powerless to rectify a foreign
sovereign's alteration of intangible property rights. Secondly, the rule, in some
ways, replicates the jurisdictional simplicity of the "jurisdiction over debtor"
rule in requiring that the debtor and the creditor be subject to the acting state's
in personam jurisdiction. These flaws have generated mounting criticism
against continuing application of this similarly mechanical situs rule. 0 The
former assumption has increasingly proven untrue, particularly, in international
private debt cases where the debtor's obligation, although leviable by the acting
sovereign, is also enforceable and collectable in the forum state through
attachment and execution of debtor's assets outside the acting state. The ability
of the forum to enforce and collect the debt, thus should serve to negate the
genuine motivation for the territoriality inquiry: respect for the acting
the realization that in most cases there was nothing the United States courts could do
about it in any event.
Tabacalera,392 F.2d at 715.
76.
See Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1364 (2d Cir. 1973).
See Cosmic Int'l, 542 F.2d at 874.
77.
78.
See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Crddito Agrfcola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516,521 (2d Cir. 1985);
Herring & Degreesubler, supra note 67, at 990-91 (arguing that in the case of depositary accounts held by
banks the situs of the obligation is where the bank "books" the liability, in other words, where the bank
carries, maintains, and makes accounting entries regarding the debt); Chow, supranote 7, at 441.
79.
See Chow, supra note 7, at 441-42; Tahyar, supra note 29, at 597-98; Ibietatorremendia, supra
note 49, at 604-05.
80.
See generallyZamora, supranote 25, at 1079-80 (citing to Calejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d
1101, 1123 (5th Cir. 1985) for the proposition that the "complete fruition" test, based on power to enforce
or collect a debt is not an adequate test of determining situs of debts for act of state purposes because the
analysis ignore the quantity and quality of contacts the debt has to the forum state).
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sovereign's reasonable expectation of dominion over property sought to be
regulated." As is argued, where the debtor has assets in the forum against
which the creditor may execute, the acting state attempting to alter the
obligation of the debtor cannot expect to have the forum enforce the alteration.
The result is the acting state will not have a reasonable expectation of dominion
over the debt.
C. On Incidents Of Debt And Reasonable Expectation Of Dominion
Despite the commonsense approach of the "fait accompli" for determining
debt situs, the rule's shortcomings have encouraged the development of an
alternative rule of reason that looks to the "incidents of the debt." Perhaps the
first decision to enunciate this alternative rule was Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco
Nacionalde Costa Rica. 2 In Libra, the court dealt with one of the first debt
crisis cases of the 1980's.83 There a Costa Rican bank was prevented from
servicing its debt to foreign creditor banks due to strict exchange control
measures imposed by the Costa Rican government, and thus was sued in the
United States by its creditor.8 4 The Costa Rican bank raised the Act of State
defense to excuse its non-performance, however, the court held the Doctrine
inapplicable having found the situs of the foreign bank's debt to be in New
York, rather than Costa Rica. 5 The rationale for its holding expressly indicated
the court's pursuit of a more flexible, multifaceted rule: "although a debtor
may in theory be sued at the creditor's choice in either of two jurisdictions, the
legal incidentsof the debt may neverthelessplace it,for the purposes ofthe act
of state doctrine, in this nation rather than in a foreign nation" (emphasis
added).86
81.
See Zamora, supranote 25, at 1079-80; see also Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1123 (holding the fact
that a "debt can be enforced by the creditor in one forum should not be the basis of depriving him of his
ability to enforce the debt in a different forum").
82.
570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
83.
The factual scenario of LibraBank provided the basis upon which the above model Case 1 is
composed. In the ensuing years following Libra Bank, the majority of exchange control cases implicating
the Act of State Doctrine came under the basic pattern of model Case 1; see, e.g., Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco
Credito Agrfcola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985); Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S.
660(1990). During the same time, however, other banking cases raising the Act of State increasingly fit the
mold of model Cases 2,4, and 5. See, e.g., Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1988); Riedel
v. Bancam, S.A., 792 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1986); Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka
v. Bancomer, S.A., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985); Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari, 610 F.
Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 463 N.E.2d 5 (N.Y. 1984); Garcia v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,
660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981).
84.
See Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 874.
85.
Id. at 881-82.
86.
Id.
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Some of the factors or "legal incidents" the Libra court emphasized
included the terms of the loan agreement respecting forum selection, choice of
law, and place of payment. Additionally, and perhaps, more importantly, the
court stressed the significance of the debtor bank's assets in the United States
and the attendant ability of the courts to enforce collection of the debt. The
court stated: "[s]ince Banco Nacional was found here and had considerable
assets here, 'the Act of State itself remain[ed] incomplete in the absence of
acquiescence by the forum state,' and in such a case as this, 'the obvious
inability of a foreign state to complete an expropriation of property beyond its
borders reduces the foreign state's expectations of dominion over that
property.' 87 Clearly, Libra sought to meld the "fait accompli" rule with another,
more flexible fact-specific approach. In so doing, it set situs analysis on a
course substantially in tune with the territorial underpinnings of the Act of State
Doctrine."8
Only a few years later the Second and Fifth Circuits, again, made
significant strides in the adoption and further development of the "incidents of
the debt" rule. In Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 89 the Fifth Circuit expressly
adopted the "incidents of debt" rule. There the court dealt with a factual
scenario upon which model Case two is based: the Mexican government
imposed exchange control restrictions that directly prevented the debtor
Mexican bank from performing its certificate of deposit obligations to a United
States creditor. The creditor sued in the United States and the Mexican bank
raised the Act of State defense. The Fifth Circuit accepted the defense holding
that the situs of the certificate of deposit right was within the territory of
Mexico and thus subject to Mexican regulations.9" The rationale employed by
the court clearly evinced an attempt to ascertain whether Mexico had a
reasonable expectation of dominion over the debt. The court, in this respect,
focused on where the deposit was carried, the contractual choice of law and
forum, and collectability. 9" Since the parties had agreed to have the deposit
carried and payable in Mexico, and the creditor could only collect from the
debtor in Mexico, the court determined that the debt was properly sitused in

87.
Id. at 884 (quoting Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1972)).
88.
Id. (holding that where a foreign government contracts to repay a debt in the United States,
consents to jurisdiction, waives sovereign immunity, and continues to maintain substantial assets in the
United States, "it can hardly be said that this court's judgment shall frustrate the foreign state's reasonable
expectations of dominion over the legal rights involved therein so as to vex our amicable relations with that
foreign nation."); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,428 (1964) (declining to lay
down or reaffirm inflexible and all-encompassing rules).
89.
764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985)
(indistinguishable factual pattern and legal outcome).
90.
Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1124.
91.
Id. at 1123-24.
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Mexico. The court, additionally, raised another seemingly significant factor for
situating the debt in Mexico stating: "[g]iven Mexico's interest in these
certificates of deposit, which were issued by a Mexican bank and payable in
Mexico, disregarding Mexico's exchange regulations would be a serious
affront."92 It appears from this statement that the court also considered the
sovereign's interest in the underlying private credit transaction.
1. The Factors
In recent time, the courts have increasingly stressed the importance of the
contractual terms of payment and choice of law and forum in determining debt
situs.93 In Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 94 the Second Circuit
expressly indicated that the intangible property right there, a certificate of
deposit allegedly confiscated by the Cuban government, was situated outside
Cuba due to a contractual stipulation in the debt instrument ensuring the safety
of the deposit against government acts. While this stipulation certainly would
have governed the legal rights as among the debtor and creditor, for the purpose
of locating the debt the court's reasoning was arguably flawed. First, the
deposit in Garcia was issued, carried, and maintained in Cuba, not in the United
States.9 5 Secondly, the creditor was not contractually deprived from collecting
the deposit in Cuba.'
Thus, the debt situs for the purpose of Cuba's
confiscatory act was reasonably expected to be within the territory of Cuba.
Notwithstanding this considerable flaw, the courts, over the years, have
continued using contractual provisions as a weightier factor than the others.
Reflecting the traditional debt situs analyses, inpersonamjurisdiction over
the debtor and enforcement/collection power are, quite obviously, another set
of factors in the "incidents of debt" rule. Whereas as every court following an
"incidents of debt" analysis has considered these essential factors, the courts
following more traditional approaches to locating a debt have too, necessarily,
looked to the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction and, both, the ability to
enforce and collect debts to determine situs.97 The one point concerning this set
92.
Id.at 1125.
93.
See Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645,649 (2d Cir. 1984); Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc. v. Galadari, 610 F. Supp. 114, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye
Garanti Bankasi, A.S., 57 N.Y.2d 315 (1982).
94.
735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984).
95.
Id. at 647-50.
96.
Id. at 647-50,652 (Kearse, J. dissenting) (stating that in the "present case, when Garcia and her
husband (collectively "Garcia") made their deposits and acquired their certificates, they agreed with Chase
that the debts could be collected on presentation of the certificates anywhere that Chase has a branch...
Cuba was not excluded") (emphasis added).
97.
See supra text accompanying notes 56 through 80; see, e.g. F. & H.R. Farman-Farmaian Consulting Eng'rs v. Harza Eng'g Co., 882 F.2d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 1989); Trinh v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164
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of factors that, to an extent, remains unsettled concerns shared collectability.
Similar to the problem confronted by the courts in applying the "jurisdiction
over debtor" rule where the forum and the acting state could validly exercise
jurisdiction, the incidence with which each state can now also exercise
enforcement and collection powers presents an area requiring clarification by
the courts.98 Essentially, where both, the acting and the forum state share
enforcement and collection powers over the intangible (derived from the same
power exercisable over the debtor), all else being equal, the court must consider
yet another factor to determine whether the foreign sovereign has retains a
reasonable expectation of dominion over that intangible.99
In Callejo, the Fifth Circuit, indeed, provided an additional factor on
which to potentially find the foreign sovereign's continued reasonable
expectation of dominion over a debt."° This factor, as mentioned above, would
allow the courts to consider the foreign sovereign's interests in the underlying
private credit transaction. In this respect, some of the interests the courts have
directly or indirectly recognized have been connected to the denomination of
the debt obligation in the foreign sovereign's currency.'"
2. Ordinary or Special Debt Situs Rules
The same year the Fifth Circuit decided Callejo, the Second Circuit had
chance to treat anew another debt crisis matter in the companion case for Libra.
In Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Cr~dito Agricola de Cartago,0 2 the court, once
more, considered the case of a Costa Rican bank's non-performance arising
from the same exchange control restrictions dealt with in Libra. The court in
Allied held, like Libra, that the debt situs was in the United States and not in
Costa Rica. Thus, the intangible property right held by the creditor was not and
could not be affected by the Costa Rican regulations, and was, as a result,

(6th Cir. 1988); Bandes v. Harlow & Jones, Inc., 852 F.2d 661,667 (2d Cir. 1988); Vishipco Line v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981); Tchacosh Co. v. Roskwell Int'l Corp., 766 F.2d 1333
(9th Cir. 1985); United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 874-75 (2d Cir. 1976); Republic of
Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965).
98.
See supra text accompanying notes 78 through 80.
99.
See Frumkin, supra note 52, at 491-93 (arguing that an additional factor to consider in shared
collectability is whether the forum court can fully or substantially satisfy the debt obligation owed to the
creditor by execution of the debtor assets within the forum). This argument is a persuasive one, particularly,
as the lack of obtaining adequate collection relief in the forum may reasonably indicate to the acting state that
it has dominion over the regulated intangible.
100. See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1125 (5th Cir. 1985); Braka v. Bancomer, S.A.,
762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985). See also Frumkin, supra note 52, at 491-92.
101. Callejo, 764 F.2d at 1124; Tahyar, supra note 29, at 613.
102. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
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enforceable in the United States. °3 The court's rationale, more than simply
apply the traditional mechanical rules, intimated that flexibility was an
important concern under the Doctrine's territoriality inquiry. °4
The result in Allied yielded yet another development in debt sits analysis.
Rather, than conform to the generally accepted "fait accompli" rules, the Allied
court made a distinction between "act of state sits analysis" and "ordinary
situs of debt analysis.""1 5 Judging from the court's opinion the reasonable
inference is that the court was no longer satisfied with the "fait accompli" rules
and instead was searching for a rule of reason, which it termed "ordinary situs
of debt analysis." On closer inspection, however, this "ordinary" analysis
considers similar, if not identical, factors as those in Libra: jurisdiction, place
of payment, and collectability.10 6 Interestingly, rather than characterizing the
analysis as one looking to the "incidents of debt", the court utilized the more
confusing term "ordinary situs analysis" as if to suggest the use of conflict of
laws rules to determine debt situs. °7
In contrast to the Allied court's leaning toward an "ordinary" conflict of
laws analysis, it has been suggested that the appropriate debt sits analysis
under the territoriality inquiry requires a unilateral focus on the expectations of
the foreign sovereign and not a balancing approach8weighing the interests of the
forum against those of the foreign sovereign."
This unilateral focus is,
arguably, implied in the Libra analysis as the court there elected not to directly
consider the potential interests of the forum in determining debt sits. The
Libra opinion consciously considered the factors outlined above (jurisdiction,
place of payment, collectability, etc.) as they related to the acting state's
reasonable expectation of dominion.
D. Devising a Continuum of Reasonableness
In determining an acting state's expectation of dominion over intangibles
the foregoing sits factors may combine to more accurately reflect the

103. Id. at 521.
104. Id. at 521-22.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 522.
107. Tahyar, supra note 29, at 611 n. 106 (noting the similarity between the debt analysis and conflict
of laws rule).
108. Id.; Miller, supra note 25, at 673; Chow, supra note 7, at 443; Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICr OF LAWS § 6 (1971); Michael Gruson, The Act ofState Doctrine in ContractCasesAs a Conflictof Laws Rule, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 519, 520 (1988); Paul N. Filzer, The Continued Viability of the Act of
State Doctrine in Foreign Branch Bank Expropriation Cases, 3 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 99, 124-25
(1988); Edmund W. Sim, Throwing A Monkey Wrench Into the Wheels of InternationalFinance: Wells
FargoAsiaLtd. v. Citibank, N.A., 11 MICH.J. INT'LL. 1039, 1058-59 (1990); Miller, supra note 25, at 683.
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reasonableness of that expectation.' °9 The ability to enforce and collect is
essential elements in determining reasonableness. So too is the power to assert
in personam jurisdiction over the debtor. Consideration of contractual
stipulations (place of payment, choice of law and forum, country risk insurance,
etc.) between the underlying private parties is an important element, but is
likely not one of fundamental value for a state's reasonable expectation of
dominion.
1. Strongest Expectation of Dominion
An acting state's regulations, when viewed through the unilateral situs
analysis, are seized with the strongest possible expectation of dominion where
the state has jurisdiction over the debtor, power to enforce and collect, and is,
either, by default or design of the underlying private parties the place of
payment. The exemplary cases on this point are Callejo and Braka. These
cases provide the factual scenario upon which model Case two is based.
2. Strong Expectation of Dominion
Following the strongest case for the acting sovereign is the fact pattern
where the state, again, has the sole power to enforce and collect the intangible
and jurisdiction over the debtor. Unlike the case above, reasonableness here
may require that the acting state have exclusive power to levy against the
debtor's assets within its sovereign territory. There have been a number of
decisions indicating that this would likely be the accepted result on this point:
Bandes v. Harlow & Jones,"0 Republic of Iraq v. FirstNational City Bank,"'
Tchacosh Co. v. Roskwell Int'l Corp.," 2 and F. & H.R. Fannan-Farmaian
Consulting Eng'rs v. Harza Eng'g Co." 3 These cases provide the factual
scenarios upon which model Cases three and five.
3. Substantial Expectation of Dominion
On the fringes of reasonableness, a state may still retain sufficient
dominion over a debt so as to come expect judicial abstention from the forum
109. See Miller, supra note 25, at 675-79.
110. 852 F.2d 661,667 (2d Cir. 1988).
111. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965).
112. 766 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1985). The facts in Tchacosh clearly also evokes the strongest
expectation of dominion for the acting sovereign. The Ninth Circuit held there that the acting state was the
place where the service contract between the parties was to be performed and where payment was impliedly
to be made.
113. 882 F.2d 281,286 (7thCir. 1989). Similar to Tchacosh, the Seventh Circuit in Farmaian, also
determined that shared enforcement and collection power did not lower the acting state's expectation of
dominion where the contractual and implied obligations were performable within the acting state.
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state where jurisdiction over the debtor can be asserted, but the power to
enforce and collect is shared with the forum state, and no other contractual
factor serves to further connect the acting sovereign with the intangible. In this
case, the acting sovereign may validly be held to retain dominion if it has a
legitimate interest in the underlying private credit transaction between the
parties. Under the additional "tie-breaking" factor in Callejo and Braka, this
interest is implicated by the acting sovereign's inherent right to regulate its
national currency and payment obligations denominated in such currency.' 4
IV. CONCLUSION

The financial obligations of developing and debtor nations, as well as the
obligations of private debtors within these debtor nations is, once more,
becoming a mounting concern for private international creditors. The fact that
these nations have in the past resorted, and may again look to drastic policy
measures to contain economic downturns should alert international and
domestic creditors to the attendant legal implications of such purely sovereign
maneuvers. The Act of State Doctrine is just one of the several jurisprudential
concerns in international credit disputes; however, to a greater degree than the
other concerns, it evokes profound considerations of sovereignty and
international comity.
Moreover, the Doctrine's territoriality inquiry,
particularly with respect to disputes over intangibles, has for many years mired
the judiciary in a morass of, on one-hand rigid standards, and on the other,
unconvincing rationale on the situs of indefinable cross-border property rights.
If any one notion on debt situs persists, it should fundamentally necessitate
legal and analytical flexibility, and must consider the reasonable expectation of
a sovereign to regulate property rights within its territory.

114.

See supra text accompanying notes 97 through 100.

